讲座：Conflict of Interest or Efficiency Improvement: Bank-affiliated Analysts in the Secondary Loan Market
题 目：Conflict of Interest or Efficiency Improvement: Bank-affiliated Analysts in the Secondary Loan Market
嘉 宾：Jinping Zhang, Ph.D. Candidate, National University of Singapore
主持人：夏立军 教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院会计系
This study examines whether syndicating banks utilize affiliated analysts’ research to shape the information environment and liquidity of secondary loans. We find that bank-affiliated analysts exhibit a greater likelihood and higher frequency of forecast issuance during the [-30, 30] window around the trading initiations of their banks’ syndicated loans. Such an effect is stronger for banks with lower capitalization levels and more loan loss provisions since they benefit more from loan sales, and weaker for banks relying more on relationship lending, as these banks value private information more than do other banks. Bank-affiliated analysts’ coverage successfully lowers bid-ask spreads and increases the market participation of on-sale secondary loans. However, the forecasts provided by bank-affiliated analysts are upward-biased. This bias, induced by banks’ information advantage and bank-affiliated analysts’ conflicts of interest, is partially incorporated into the pricing decisions of both loan- and equity investors.
Jinping Zhang is a doctoral candidate in Accounting at the NUS Business School, National University of Singapore. Her research areas of interest include corporate disclosure, financial analysts, bank loans, and supply chains. She has a master degree and a bachelor degree in accounting, both from Zhongnan University of Economics and Law.