讲座：Double Directional Persuasion
题 目：Double Directional Persuasion
嘉 宾：郑捷 副教授 清华大学经济管理学院
主持人：李淑雯 助理教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院
地 点：上海交通大学 徐汇校区安泰楼A503室
We study a double directional persuasion game between a buyer who knows his type of valuation and a seller who has professional knowledge regarding the buyer’s needs. We endogenize the timing of play in both ex-ante design stage and ex-post implementation stage. We fully characterize equilibrium whenever it exists and perform comparative statics regarding the order of play. Our main results include: 1. even when the buyer is a rational Bayesian, the seller could oversell to increase the revenue; 2. for sequential design, equilibrium always exists and both players benefit from second mover advantage; 3. when buyer signals first, sequential design Pareto dominates simultaneous one. The finding is consistent with daily observations that customers like to haggle while sellers tend to oversell.
Prof. Zheng received his Ph.D. in Economics from Washington University in St. Louis. He is currently Associate Professor in the Department of Economics and Executive Associate Director of the Tsinghua Economic Science and Policy Experimental Laboratory, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University. He is an Associate Editor for Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. His research areas include Information Economics, Behavioral Economics, and Experimental Economics. His current research covers both classical topics including mechanism design, market design, and information design, and behavioral topics including reference-dependence, self-control, and social preferences. Prof. Zheng has served as Principal Investigator on numerous research grants including National Natural Science Foundation of China (with evaluation of "Distinguished Excellence"), and has given plenary talks at many academic conferences. His research papers have been published in leading journals in Economics, Management, and Science, including American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), Games and Economic Behavior, Management Science, and Nature Communications. His work has also been published in the Handbook of Experimental Economic Methodology.