讲座：The Politics of Bank Opacity
题 目：The Politics of Bank Opacity
嘉 宾：钟覃琳 助理教授 中国人民大学商学院
主持人：郭凯 助理教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院
This study examines how the distribution of power in the political system shapes the financial reporting opacity of banks. We find that banks located in states with senators on the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (BC senators) have greater abnormal loan loss provisions, our proxy for opacity, than banks in other states. The result is stronger for larger banks and for banks with higher risk. In investigating the mechanisms involved, we find that BC senators have a negative effect on the likelihood of banks in their home states receiving enforcement actions, and, more importantly, this effect is stronger for more opaque banks. The effect of BC senators on bank opacity and the interactive effect of BC senators and opacity on enforcement actions are more pronounced when the senators wield more political clout. These findings suggest that politicians, regulators, and banks employ opaque financial reporting to facilitate regulatory forbearance. Regarding real effects, we find that BC senators are associated with more future loan losses and a higher risk of bank insolvency, and that bank opacity is a significant channel through which BC senators affect these real outcomes. During economic downturns, however, BC senators appear to promote bank opacity to encourage bank lending and create liquidity. Finally, the capital market does not appear to penalize the reporting opacity of banks in states with BC senators.
钟覃琳博士现任中国人民大学商学院助理教授，主要研究领域为公司治理与公司信息披露。曾在《管理世界》，《金融研究》，《会计研究》，Journal of Accounting and Economics, Contemporary Accounting Research, Accounting and Finance等期刊发表多篇论文。