讲座：Promotions, Adverse Selection, and Efficiency
题 目：Promotions, Adverse Selection, and Efficiency
嘉 宾：殷臻达 助理教授 北京大学深圳研究生院
主持人：郭士祺 助理教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院
地 点：上海交通大学 徐汇校区安泰经济与管理学院A407室
This paper considers how adverse selection in the labor market affects the efficiency of promotion decisions. In the model, when a high ability worker is not promoted because of a lack of available managerial openings, it is efficient for the worker to move to a firm seeking a high ability worker to promote. In the presence of asymmetric employer learning, adverse selection can stop this type of turnover from occurring due to the private information of the worker’s current employer. We show that employing up-or-out contracts for young workers with the highest expected ability can be an efficient response to this adverse selection problem, because it forces turnover for workers not promoted which improves the efficiency of promotion decisions. In addition to highlighting a distortion concerning promotion decisions due to asymmetric employer learning and adverse selection, and the ability of up-or-out contracts to reduce the distortion, our analysis also explains various observations concerning real-world promotion decisions and practices related to up-or-out.
Zhenda Yin is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the Peking University HSBC Business School. He obtained his PhD degree in Economics from Cornell University. His main research interests include Personnel Economics, Organizational Economics, and Industrial Organizations. In Personnel Economics and Organizational Economics, he explores issues related to incentives, matching firms with workers, compensation, skill development, and organization of work. In Industrial Organizations, he is interested in topics related to digital economy such as pricing, platforms, and networks.