讲座：Eliciting willingness-to-pay to decompose beliefs and preferences in selection into competition
题 目：Eliciting willingness-to-pay to decompose beliefs and preferences in selection into competition
We develop a novel econometric methodology to identify the determinants of self-selection into alternative compensation schemes in a laboratory setting. We consider a class of economic models with risk-neutral individuals selecting the compensation schemes that maximize their expected utilities. Given the model and any additional restrictions, we characterize the sharp identified-sets for individual-specific willingness-to-pay, subjective beliefs, and preferences. We establish that an extension of the Niederle and Vesterlund  design that judiciously expands the set of compensation schemes and incorporates Multiple Price Lists to elicit willingness-to-pay for these schemes results in informative bounds when the sharp bounds would otherwise be uninformative under their design. We apply our methods to examine gender differences in preference for competitive compensation schemes, differentiating between alternative explanations that are observationally equivalent using the Niederle and Vesterlund design. Our main finding is that what has commonly been attributed to a gender difference in preference for performing in a competition is instead explained by men having relatively greater over-confidence in their future performance relative to their past performance under a competitive compensation scheme. Overall, our empirical results suggest that men and women do not systematically differ in their taste for competition, but instead differ in their performance-related beliefs.
陈劼博士现就职于上海科技大学创业与管理学院，担任副教授及数据化经济政策研究中心主任。陈劼博士本科毕业于华盛顿大学（圣路易斯），获得计算机科学理学学士学位，后在耶鲁大学获得经济学博士学位。在加入上科大前曾就职于新加坡国立大学李光耀公共政策学院。她的研究方向主要集中于发展经济学，尤其是人力资本、环境及性别相关问题。文章曾发表于Journal of Human Resources, Journal of Development Economics, Review of Finance, Energy Policy 等杂志。