Title: Monopsony and Backloaded Compensation: Theory and Evidence from Public Accountants

Speaker: Bernardo S. Silveira, Professor, University of Zurich

Host: Weicheng Min, Associate Professor, Antai College of Economics and Management, Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Time: 14:00‑15:30, Wednesday, September 23, 2026

Venue: Room A503, Antai College of Economics and Management, Xuhui Campus, Shanghai Jiao Tong University

Brief introduction of the content: 

In monopsony models, wage markdowns induce deadweight loss and are therefore inefficient. Yet markdowns also arise in models with backloaded efficiency pay, where they are designed to induce effort among early-career workers and are thus efficient. To reconcile—and empirically distinguish—these two mechanisms, we build a dynamic model incorporating labor market power and endogenous effort. Estimating a team production model on novel data on U.S. public accounting firms, we find evidence of both: markdowns for junior workers and markups for senior ones reflect incentive-providing backloading, while monopsony power induces a ’lifetime’ wage markdown of 15%.

Speaker's profile:

Bernardo S. Silveira is a Professor at the University of Zurich and an Assistant Professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, where he is currently on leave for the 2026–2027 academic year. His research interests include applied microeconomics, law and economics, political economy, and industrial organization.

Welcome all!