题   目：Tournament-Style  Political Competition and Local Protectionism: Theory and Evidence from China

嘉   宾：李明，助理教授，香港中文大学（深圳）

主持人：XI ZHI LIM，助理教授，上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

时   间：2022年12月14日（周三）11:30-13:00

地   点：腾讯会议 （校内师生如需会议号和密码，请发邮件至yueqiwang@sjtu.edu.cn获取）

内容简介：

We argue that inter-jurisdictional competition in a  regionally decentralized authoritarian regime distorts local politicians’  incentives in resource allocation among firms from their own city and a  competing city. We develop a tournament model of project selection that  captures the driving forces of local protectionism. The model robustly  predicts that the joint presence of regional spillover and the incentive for  political competition leads to biased resource allocations against the  competing regions. Combining several unique data sets, we test our model  predictions in the context of government procurement allocation and firms'  equity investment across Chinese cities.   We find that, first, when local politicians are in more intensive  political competition, they allocate less government procurement contracts to  firms in the competing city; second, local firms, especially local SOEs,  internalize the local politicians’ career concerns and invest less in the  competing cities. Our paper provides a political economy explanation for  inefficient local protectionism in an autocracy incentivized by  tournament-style political competition.

演讲人简介：

Ming Li is an Assistant Professor of Economics at the  Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen. Her research interests cover topics  of the Chinese economy, political economy, and empirical auctions. Her current  research focus on entrepreneurship, China’s land market, the local government's  role in shaping firm dynamics, as well as the interaction between China’s  migration policy and the labor market.

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