嘉    宾： 冯唐人  助理教授  博科尼大学

主持人： 林熙之  助理教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

时    间： 2025年 7月21日（周一）上午10:00-11:15

地    点:  上海交通大学徐汇校区安泰经济与管理学院B716

内容简介：

We study interim strategy-proofness (ISP), a mechanism design criterion that extends the familiar concept of strategy-proofness to settings with interdependent values. ISP requires a mechanism to provide each agent with a strategy that guarantees the highest expected utility—where the expectation is taken with respect to her belief about the other agents’ types—regardless of the strategies played by the other agents. We show that ISP mechanisms are immune to the presence of agents subject to various cognitive limitations: those who do not have a correct conjecture about other agents’ strategies, those who are unaware of their higher-order beliefs, and those who entertain “cursed” beliefs. For a binary collective choice setting, we provide a characterization of ISP mechanisms. The main insight of this characterization is the identification of a constraint on how much strategic externality agents are allowed to impose on each other, with the constraint being less severe when preferences are less interdependent. This characterization enables us to find an optimal ISP mechanism for the jury model and prove that the Condorcet Jury Theorem does not hold when ISP is required.

演讲人简介：

Tangren Feng is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Decision Sciences and an affiliate of IGIER at Bocconi University. He was a visiting scholar at the Cowles Foundation and the Department of Economics at Yale University during the 2024–25 academic year. He received his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Michigan in 2020. His research focuses on economic theory, with a particular interest in mechanism design and social choice. His work has been published in Econometrica, Theoretical Economics, and the Journal of Mathematical Economics.