题   目：Irreversible  Investment in Technology and the Dynamics of Public Good Provision

嘉   宾：邓留纯，Assistant Professor，Yale-NUS College

主持人：闵炜程，助理教授，上海交通大学

时   间：2023年3月15日（周三）12:40-14:10

地   点：上海交通大学（徐汇校区）安泰经济与管理学院A403

内容简介：

We  analyze a model of public good provision and technology investment when two  parties  alternate in power  stochastically. In each period, the incumbent decides how much public good to provide  and how much to invest in a technology that lowers the cost of public good  provision in the future. The two parties place differential weights on the  public good, and this difference is taken to be the index of polarization. We  obtain the following results in Markov Perfect equilibrium in the  infinite-horizon game. (i) When polarization is low, steady state distribution  is invariant to the degree of reversibility of the investment.  When polarization is high, both parties  provide more public good in steady state when investment is irreversible than  when  reversible. (ii) Higher power  turnover results in higher levels of technology stock and more public good  provision if polarization is low. (iii) Under high power turnover, as parties  get more polarized, the expected technology stock and provision of public  good  in steady state first fall, then  jump upward when irreversibility binds.

演讲人简介：

Liuchun  Deng is an assistant professor of economics at Yale-NUS College. His research  focuses on the labor market and productivity consequences of automation and  international trade. He also works on the theory of economic dynamics with  applications to development, political economy, and trade. Liuchun Deng holds  a Ph.D. in Economics from Johns Hopkins University.

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