讲座:Brick or Click: Managing Outpatient (Tele)visits with Strategic Behavior 发布时间:2025-03-10

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题 目:Brick or Click: Managing Outpatient (Tele)visits with Strategic Behavior

嘉 宾:王杉 副教授 中山大学管理学院

主持人:许欢 教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

时 间:2025年3月14日(周五)10:00-11:30

地 点:安泰楼B207室

内容简介:

The COVID-19 pandemic accelerated telemedicine adoption, offering a convenient alternative to in-person care. However, televisits may not fully address health concerns and sometimes require supplementary in-person visits, consuming resources that could have been saved if the initial visit had been in-person. As the pandemic subsides, in-person visits are regaining popularity, prompting providers to reorient resources towards in-person care. Transportation subsidies for patients, funded by providers or the government, play a critical role in facilitating in-person visits. In this evolving landscape of telemedicine, we study how an outpatient care provider can optimally balance virtual and in-person services and whether, and how, to engage with transportation subsidies. We develop a stylized queueing-game model to represent the operations of a revenue-maximizing provider serving patients who strategically choose between service channels. We find that provider size, measured by total capacity relative to demand, is key. Small and large providers perform best by focusing on one channel without offering subsidies, whereas medium-sized providers benefit from carefully balancing both channels alongside subsidies. Paradoxically, transportation subsidies, which make in-person care more accessible, may reduce overall patient access to care, even when fully funded by the government. This occurs because providers may shift capacity toward a higher-reimbursement channel, ultimately serving fewer patients. Differentiating payment rates between in-person and virtual visits can potentially prevent such reductions. Our study highlights the importance of capacity coordination between channels for providers and cautions policymakers that transportation support may unintentionally harm patient access. Properly designed financial incentives can help prevent such negative outcomes.

演讲人简介:

王杉,博士毕业于上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院,现任中山大学管理学院副教授。她的研究兴趣是带有复杂行为与约束的服务系统设计与控制,重点关注医疗保健这一特殊应用领域,并以如何及时、有效和高效地提供医疗服务作为研究目标。相关研究成果发表于Management Science、M&SOM等国内外权威期刊,并获得国家自然科学基金优青项目的资助,以及教育部优秀成果奖(人文社会科学)二等奖、POMS CHOM Best Paper Award等国内外学术奖励。

 

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