讲座:Allocating Emission Permits Efficiently via Uniform Linear Mechanisms 发布时间:2025-04-03
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题 目:Allocating Emission Permits Efficiently via Uniform Linear Mechanisms
嘉 宾:鲁家琦 助理教授 香港中文大学(深圳)
主持人:许欢 教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院
时 间:2025年4月10日(周四)14:00-15:30
地 点:安泰楼A511室
内容简介:
We study how to initially allocate emission permits in an emissions trading system. Classic economic theory states that, under standard assumptions, the equilibrium consumer surplus and social welfare are independent of the initial lump sum allocation of emission permits, and that Cap-and-Trade and Carbon Tax systems are equivalent. We show that, by allowing more general allocation mechanisms that are component-wise concave in the firm’s production decision, which capture many realistic allocation rules including lump sum allocations (such as grandfathering), output-based allocations (either top-down or bottom-up), etc., the system’s equilibrium outcome is no longer independent of the initial allocations. In particular, for N firms operating under Cournot competition that differs only in their abatement abilities, uniform linear permit allocation mechanisms achieve Pareto efficiency in consumer surplus and total pollution, which also achieve efficiency in total emission reduction. With this result, the regulator’s infinite-dimensional policy design question can be reduced to a single- dimensional one, and the original N -firm system can be equivalently represented by a monopoly so that no firm’s private information is required. Numerical experiments show that the benefit of uniform linear mechanisms compared to lump sum ones can be large. We also explain when the efficiency of uniform linear allocation mechanisms might fail, and how the efficiency of uniform linear mechanisms can be meaningfully extended. This gives managerial insight into the design of allocation coefficients in practically used output-based allocation methods.
演讲人简介:
Jiaqi Lu is an assistant professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (Shenzhen) since 2021, with a joint appointment in the School of Data Science and the School of Management and Economics. Before 2021, she obtained her Ph.D in Decision, Risk and Operations at Columbia Business School. Jiaqi Lu conducts research in market design and mechanism design, with a particular focus on platforms, matching markets and supply chain. Her work has appeared in journals and conferences such as Mathematics of Operations Research, Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, Conference on Web and Internet Economics.
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