题　目：Corporate Debt Covenants and Lenders’ Private Information: Theory and Evidence from Global Air Connectivity

嘉　宾：王自干 副教授 清华大学

主持人：凃俊 教授 上海交通大学安泰经济与管理学院

时　间：2026年4月14日（周二）13:30-15:00

地　点：上海交通大学 徐汇校区安泰浩然楼204

内容简介:

This study provides a theoretical and empirical analysis of how loan contracts are designed when accounting-based covenants contingently allocate control rights, and lenders engage in costly private information acquisition following covenant violations. The benefit of lenders' private information acquisition is greater when accounting signals are less informative about efficient liquidations. We show that optimal debt contracts set tighter covenants and lower interest spreads when lenders' marginal private information acquisition costs are lower. Furthermore, both effects are stronger for borrowers with lower accounting information quality. Using syndicated loan data, we test these predictions by exploiting global long-distance passenger air links as a proxy for information acquisition costs and find results consistent with the model. We further strengthen our identification by employing a regression discontinuity approach based on the discontinuity of direct flight availability around 6,000 miles. Placebo tests using cargo flights and flights to participant lenders show no significance, confirming the private information acquisition by lead lenders in syndicated loans.

演讲人简介：

王自干博士，清华大学经济学学士，哥伦比亚大学经济学博士，现任清华大学经济管理学院和深圳国际研究生院长聘副教授。研究领域包括实证公司金融、外汇、国际金融、环境经济学、政治经济学、金融安全、AI for Business。他的研究发表在MS,JFE,JoE,JIE,JFQA,RoF,JCF,JEF,JIMF等多本经济学和商科期刊以及AAAI,CVPR,KDD,BIBM等AI国际会议上，常年受邀为美国西部金融学会(WFA)和多本商科期刊、AI会议的论文审稿人， 并两次获得澳大利亚银行业与金融业会议（AFBC）的公司财务最佳论文奖等多项奖项。

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